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Abstract In an effort to understand how to improve student
learning about evolution, a focus of science education re-
search has been to document and address students’ naive
ideas. Less research has investigated how students reason
about alternative scientific models that attempt to explain the
same phenomenon (e.g., which causal model best accounts for
evolutionary change?). Within evolutionary biology, research
has yet to explore how non-adaptive factors are situatedwithin
students’ conceptual ecologies of evolutionary causation. Do
students construct evolutionary explanations that include non-
adaptive and adaptive factors? If so, how are non-adaptive
factors structured within students’ evolutionary explanations?
We used clinical interviews and two paper and pencil instru-
ments (one open-response and one multiple-choice) to inves-
tigate the use of non-adaptive and adaptive factors in
undergraduate students’ patterns of evolutionary reasoning.
After instruction that included non-adaptive causal factors
(e.g., genetic drift), we found them to be remarkably uncom-
mon in students’ explanatory models of evolutionary change
in both written assessments and clinical interviews. However,
consistent with many evolutionary biologists’ explanations,
when students used non-adaptive factors they were conceptu-
alized as causal alternatives to selection. Interestingly, use of
non-adaptive factors was not associated with greater under-
standing of natural selection in interviews or written assess-
ments, or with fewer naive ideas of natural selection. Thus,
reasoning using non-adaptive factors appears to be a distinct
facet of evolutionary thinking. We propose a theoretical
framework for an expert–novice continuum of evolutionary
reasoning that incorporates both adaptive and non-adaptive
factors, and can be used to inform instructional efficacy in
evolutionary biology.
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Introduction
A central goal of science education reform is to refocus
teaching, learning, and assessment on core concepts or “big
ideas” (e.g., NRC 2001a, 2001b; AAAS 2011). One such big
idea in the life sciences is biological evolution. Although
evolution comprises the framework upon which the life sci-
ences are structured (Dobzhansky 1973), student learning of
the idea and its associated causal concepts remains extremely
problematic for students at all levels of the educational hier-
archy (Bishop and Anderson 1990; Nehm and Reilly 2007;
Gregory 2009; Opfer et al. 2012). In an effort to understand
how to improve student learning about evolution, a major
thrust of science education research has been to focus on
students’ naive ideas (misconceptions) about evolution and
develop pedagogies to initiate conceptual change (e.g.,
Demastes et al. 1995). Considerably less research has focused
on how students reason about alternative scientific models
seeking to explain the same phenomenon (e.g., of the possible
causes, which most powerfully account for evolutionary
change?). Indeed, within the field of science education, re-
search has focused overwhelmingly on adaptive and selective
explanations for evolutionary change. Research has yet to
explore how non-adaptive factors are situated within students’
conceptual ecologies1 of evolutionary causation.
1 Conceptual ecologies refer to the interactive network of a person’s
epistemological commitments, beliefs and their different kinds of
knowledge that collectively form the foundational, “organizing con-
ceptions” of that person’s worldview (Demastes et al. 1995, p. 638).
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While intense debate about the causal factors accounting
for the structure of the natural world persists in many sci-
ence domains, and reflects deeply complex philosophical
and epistemological tensions (e.g., Conway Morris 2003;
Randall 2011), we wish to engage with this topic at a level
that intersects with important questions about the teaching
of evolution. Within the field of evolutionary biology, adap-
tive (e.g., natural selection) and non-adaptive (e.g., genetic
drift) frameworks have been used to account for and explain
(conceptually and methodologically) the processes that un-
dergird evolutionary patterns in the living world, both past
and present (Gould 2002). While the body of work in this
area is immense, we wish to focus attention on two concepts
that represent core perspectives on evolutionary causation
and have direct relevance to undergraduate science educa-
tors: natural selection and genetic drift (Table 1).
Natural selection is considered by many evolutionary
biologists to be the primary mechanism causing adaptive
evolutionary change (Pigliucci and Müller 2010). Adaptive
evolutionary change occurs when the frequency of a trait
(genetic or phenotypic feature) increases because it confers a
survival or reproductive advantage to the “individuals”
(genes, bacteria, animals, etc.) possessing it (Dawkins 1976;
Darwin 1859). Importantly, as noted above, natural selection
is not the only process leading to evolutionary changes in the
living world. Alternative mechanisms, collectively known as
“non-adaptive” factors, include concepts such as genetic drift
and developmental constraints, among others (Gould and
Lewontin 1979; Nickels et al. 1996; Gould 2002). Non-
adaptive change (e.g., genetic drift) occurs when the frequen-
cy of a trait increases or decreases in a population because of
stochastic factors, regardless of whether the trait confers an
advantage, disadvantage, or is neutral with respect to survival
or reproduction (Freeman 2005).
As noted by Orr (1998, p. 2099), evolutionary biologists
have long been seeking ways to determine whether
Table 1 Definitions of natural selection and genetic drift from glossaries of introductory college biology textbooks
Term Definition Textbook
Natural Selection A process in which organisms with certain inherited characteristics
are more likely to survive and reproduce than are organisms with
other characteristics.
Campbell, N.A., Reece, J.B., Urry, L.A.,
Cain, M.L., Wasserman, S.A.,
Minorsky P.V., and R.B. Jackson.
(2008). Biology. 8th ed. New York:
Pearson Benjamin Cummings.
Natural Selection The process by which individuals with certain heritable traits tend to
produce more surviving offspring than do individuals without those
traits, resulting in a change in the genetic makeup of the population.
A major mechanism of evolution.
Freeman, S. (2005) Biological
Science. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle
River: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Natural Selection The differential survival and/or reproduction of classes of entities that
differ in one or more characteristics; the difference in survival and/
or reproduction is not due to chance, and it must have the potential
consequence of altering the proportions of the different entities to
constitute natural selection. Thus natural selection is also definable
as a partly or wholly deterministic difference in the contribution of
different classes of entities to subsequent generations. Usually the
differences are inherited. The entities may be alleles, genotypes or
subsets of genotypes, populations, or in the broadest sense, species.
Futuyma, D.J. (1998). Evolutionary
Biology. 3rd ed. Sunderland: Sinauer
Associates, Inc.
Genetic Drift A process in which chance events cause unpredictable fluctuations in
allele frequencies from one generation to the next. Effects of
genetic drift are most pronounced in small populations.
Campbell et al. (2008). Biology. 8th ed.
New York: Pearson Benjamin Cummings.
Genetic Drift Any change in allele frequencies due to random events. Causes allele
frequencies to drift up and down randomly over time, and
eventually can lead to the fixation or loss of alleles.
Freeman, S. (2005) Biological
Non-adaptive change (e.g., genetic drift) occurs when the frequency
of a trait increases or decreases because of stochastic factors,
regardless of whether the trait confers an advantage, disadvantage,
or is neutral with respect to survival or reproduction
Science. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle
River: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Genetic Drift Random changes in the frequencies of two or more alleles or
genotypes within a population
Futuyma, D.J. (1998). Evolutionary
Biology. 3rd ed. Sunderland: Sinauer
Associates, Inc.
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differences in phenotype or genotype frequencies (e.g., pro-
portions of short vs. long spines within a population) were
caused by natural selection, genetic drift, or combinations of
the two factors. Biologists often conceptualize selection and
drift as alternative or competing evolutionary explanations;
selection is deterministic, and drift is stochastic (Sober 1984,
p. 110). Methodologically, several approaches have been de-
veloped by evolutionary biologists to empirically test the
causal contributions of these two processes (for details, see
Orr 1998). While many studies have modeled evolutionary
change as being caused by either selection or drift, research has
also looked at the collective contributions of both mechanisms to
evolutionary change (i.e., selection and drift; Ackermann and
Cheverud 2004; Parker and Maynard Smith 1990).
The relative importance of selection and drift has been
controversial within evolutionary biology for some time. Evo-
lution by natural selection was introduced through the work of
Darwin (1859) and Wallace (1871) and gained ground after
the “eclipse of Darwinism” in the early twentieth century
(Bowler 1983). At this time, publications raised the question
of the relative contributions of selection and random survival
(e.g., Hagedoorn and Hagedoorn 1921; Fisher 1922). Fisher,
for example, viewed deterministic processes as paramount
and natural selection as the only important cause of evolution-
ary change (Provine 1971). Genetic drift was introduced pri-
marily through Wright’s studies of population genetics in the
early 1930s, but a lack of convincing experimental evidence
led some evolutionary biologists, including Fisher, to reject
drift as an important cause of evolutionary change (Savage
1969; Provine 1971).
These earlier debates were revived with Kimura’s (1968)
finding of a high rate of neutral mutation; such empirical
findings provided support for stochastic causal contributors
(e.g., genetic drift) to evolutionary change. Nevertheless,
many evolutionary biologists remained strong subscribers of
what some have termed an “adaptationist approach” to evolu-
tion. For instance, Mayr argued that it is the goal of the
evolutionary biologist to first try “to explain biological phe-
nomena and processes as the product of natural selection”
(1983, p. 326). Gould and Lewontin (1979) countered that
Mayr’s view is typical of what they caricatured as the “Pan-
glossian paradigm.” Gould and Lewontin refer to Voltaire’s
Dr. Pangloss of Candide, whose philosophy that “everything
is for the best in this best of all possible worlds” leads to
numerous just-so explanatory stories, such as “the nose has
been formed to bear spectacles – thus we have spectacles”
(Voltaire 2010, p. 2). The Panglossian paradigm serves as a
metaphor for some biologists’ adaptationist approach to evo-
lution, where the presence of traits is explained through the
useful function of those traits.
The Panglossian paradigm demands deterministic explan-
ations, thereby precluding any possibility of trait origins being
a product of non-adaptive factors such as drift. Gould and
Lewontin (1979, p. 587) warned of the dangers of such
explanatory approaches: “One must not confuse the fact that
a structure is used in some way…with the primary evolution-
ary reason for its existence and conformation.” Likewise,
Lynch (2007) viewed selection-centered views as reducing
evolution to a form of “engineering,” which he considered
not only unnecessary, but also misleading. Other scientists, in
contrast, have taken a holistic approach to evolutionary
change that recognizes the relative contributions of both caus-
al factors (e.g., Parker and Maynard Smith 1990; Ackermann
and Cheverud 2004). In short, evolutionary biologists have
debated how evolutionary change should be framed, with
some taking an adaptationist approach, and others taking a
more pluralistic approach to evolutionary causation.
The competing roles of selection and drift in evolutionary
causation have also been a subject of debate for philoso-
phers of biology, though the importance of both concepts is
not disputed (Rosenberg and McShea 2008; Sober 1984).
Discussions in the field of philosophy concern whether or
not drift and selection are in fact two distinct concepts (e.g.,
Beatty 1984; Matthen and Ariew 2002; Millstein 2002;
Rosenberg and McShea 2008; Sober 1984). Additionally,
it has been argued that depending on what kind of question
is being asked (e.g., evolutionary origin vs. evolutionary
differences), explanations will involve collaborative or com-
peting roles of selection and drift (Rosenberg and McShea
2008). Overall, in the philosophical and scientific commu-
nities, selection and drift are widely recognized by scientists
and philosophers as two central evolutionary processes that
should be considered when developing and testing explan-
ations for trait differences between units (e.g., genomes,
populations, species, etc.). Yet, Rosenberg and McShea
(2008) point out that “recognizing the role of drift is not
the same thing as agreeing on what it is, how it works, and
what its relation to adaptation is” (p. 65). Thus, the primary
debate concerns understanding what drift is, as well as the
relative contributions of selection and drift.
Selection and Drift in Science Education Stochastic pro-
cesses are acknowledged as potential contributors to evolu-
tionary change by biologists and philosophers (Gould 2002;
see above), and life science curricula appear to reflect such
normative conceptualizations. For students to achieve more
expert-like competency in evolutionary reasoning, then,
they must consider both adaptive and non-adaptive process-
es as possible contributors to evolutionary causation. Alter-
native mechanisms to natural selection are notably present
in undergraduate and graduate biology programs and most
college biology textbooks (e.g., Campbell et al. 2008).
Though non-adaptive causal mechanisms are present, cov-
erage of these factors varies; indices of introductory biology
textbooks indicate relatively low frequencies of topics relat-
ed to “genetic drift” (Campbell et al. 2008: 3 pages/1267
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content pages; Freeman 2005: 9 pages/1238 content pages).
For evolution textbooks, the indices indicate slightly higher
frequencies of topics related to “genetic drift” (Futuyma
1998: 32 pages/754 content pages; Ridley 2004; 47 pages/
681 content pages). Reviews of collections of textbooks and
laboratory manuals have also found non-adaptive factors to
be present but minimally covered (Linhart 1997; Maret and
Rissing 1998). In addition, considering the reliance on texts
for teaching (Carpenter et al. 2006; Cuseo 2007), it is
possible that most undergraduate science curricula may
over-emphasize natural selection at the expense of non-
adaptive factors. The possible consequences of a nearly
exclusive focus on natural selection as the cause of evolu-
tionary change raise the question as to whether biology
education is reifying an adaptationist approach.
Although a number of studies have developed activities
for teaching genetic drift in the classroom, or advocated for
hands-on activities relating to genetic drift (e.g., Nickels et
al. 1996; Maret and Rissing 1998; Staub 2002), remarkably
little work has been done to explore how (or if) students
think about non-adaptive factors in evolutionary change. We
know that practicing evolutionary biologists attribute
evolutionary change to selection, non-adaptive factors
(e.g., genetic drift) or a combination of these two factors,
but what do students’ explanations of evolutionary causa-
tion look like? This question motivated our explorations of
biology students’ non-adaptive and adaptive evolutionary
reasoning patterns.
Theoretical Framework
It is well established that students bring a variety of intuitive
ideas to school that are in conflict with normative scientific
perspectives (e.g., Wandersee et al. 1994). Students deal
with these contradictions in a variety of ways: they may
ignore the new information and continue using their
previous frameworks, they may maintain both the new and
old information in parallel, accessing each in specific
contexts or situations, or they may construct a new conceptual
framework that incorporates both the new and old knowledge
(Fosnot 1996). Students use their existing conceptual
frameworks to process new experiences (e.g., assimilation)
or, when the students’ current frameworks are inadequate in
allowing them to make sense of new experiences, they must
reorganize and/or replace them with new concepts (e.g.,
accommodation; Demastes et al. 1995; Posner et al. 1982;
Sinatra et al. 2008).
Students’ alternative conceptions in science, particularly
those regarding natural selection, are well documented (e.g.,
Bishop and Anderson 1990; Settlage 1994; Demastes et al.
1995; Demastes et al. 1995; Ferrari and Chi 1998; Nehm
and Reilly 2007; Nehm and Schonfeld 2007; Nehm 2009;
Gregory 2009). These alternative conceptions are both
abundant and persistent, and efforts to target them through
instruction have yielded varied results (e.g., Bishop and
Anderson 1990; Demastes et al. 1995, 1996; Dagher and
BouJaoude 1997; Ferrari and Chi 1998; Nehm and Reilly
2007; Sinatra et al. 2008). In an effort to understand how to
improve student learning and thinking about evolution, most
of the research in evolution education has focused on stu-
dents’ naive ideas and how to change them (e.g., Demastes
et al. 1995; Demastes et al. 1995, 1996; Sinatra et al. 2008).
Much less research has focused on how students incorporate
alternative scientific models of evolutionary causation; that
is, work has yet to explore how non-adaptive factors should
be situated theoretically, or how non-adaptive factors such
as genetic drift are incorporated into students’ conceptual
ecologies of evolution.
The Development of Evolutionary Reasoning: Theoretically
Situating Non-adaptive Causation The National Research
Council [NRC] (2001b) argues that an understanding of how
students think and reason about domain-specific ideas should
undergird the design of teaching, curriculum, and assessment.
Such models should be based upon empirical evidence about
how “students represent knowledge and develop competence
in the domain” (2001b, p. 3). Taken collectively, the
aforementioned studies about student thinking and alternative
concepts of evolution and natural selection contribute to the
development of a model of how students think about and learn
evolutionary concepts. Despite important early work in this
area (cf. Catley et al. 2005), non-adaptive factors remain to be
incorporated within cognitive models of evolutionary compe-
tence and corresponding learning progressions.
Novice–expert studies, common in many areas of science
education, provide crucial insights into notions of “compe-
tency” as well as what is meant by normative and accurate
scientific understanding (NRC 2001b). When comparing
novices with experts, research demonstrates that differences
between novice students and expert scientists lie in a variety
of factors, including metacognition, organization and cate-
gorization of knowledge, and presuppositions surrounding
knowledge (e.g., Vosniadou 1999; Chi et al. 1981; Nehm
and Ridgway 2011). Novice–expert studies have also com-
pared knowledge representation and which concepts are
used to build explanations to account for scientific phenom-
ena (Keil and Wilson 2000). Unfortunately, only one study
has explored novice–expert reasoning patterns in evolution,
with a focus almost exclusively on natural selection (Nehm
and Ridgway 2011).
While reasoning about evolutionary change is diverse and
complex, expert–novice reasoning patterns, and associated
benchmarks of competency, may be simplified and modeled
along a continuum based on existing research (see Table 2). In
this framework, novices are defined as those who tend to use
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exclusively naive ideas, or both naive ideas and key concepts2
of natural selection, in their explanations of evolutionary change
(Nehm and Ridgway 2011). In contrast, “emerging experts” are
those whose explanations include key concepts of natural se-
lection, but not naive ideas (Nehm and Ridgway 2011). Though
emerging experts provide accurate conceptions of selective
causation, they may fail to incorporate possible non-adaptive
factors, such as genetic drift, which are more common in
experts’ models of evolutionary change (Nehm and Ridgway
2011). Experts may attribute change to either natural selection
or genetic drift (e.g., Orr 1998), or they may incorporate both
selection and drift (or other stochastic, non-adaptive processes;
e.g., Ackermann and Cheverud 2004). Considering that biolo-
gists employ either or both of these factors, it is reasonable to
use these conceptual models as benchmarks for expert-like
reasoning about evolution for life sciences students (Table 2,
top row).While the goal of education is not to make all students
scientific experts, domain-specific scientific literacy and com-
petency, based on expert reasoning, is an appropriate expecta-
tion for undergraduate students, particularly those completing
upper-level courses (Duit 2003; NRC 2001b).
Nonetheless, students have difficulty understanding and rea-
soning about evolution, and their naive ideas arewell documented
in the literature (e.g., Gregory 2009). Researchers have docu-
mented the persistence of naive ideas, while new, accurate scien-
tific concepts are added to naive “knowledge” frameworks
(Vosniadou et al. 2008; Kelemen and Rosset 2009; Nehm
2010). Indeed, students may assimilate scientific concepts learned
in school into their pre-existing knowledge frameworks, unaware
of any conflict between the two, thereby creating mixed or
synthetic mental models of the phenomenon (Vosniadou et al.
2008; Nehm andHa 2011). Based on prior studies, it is likely that
most undergraduate students are concentrated at the bottom end of
our expert–novice continuum for evolutionary reasoning (where
reasoning about evolutionary change either involves only naive
ideas and discarded historical concepts or comprises mixed mod-
els composed of both naive ideas and some accurate and/or
discarded scientific concepts; see Table 2, bottom row).
Not all students neatly fit into these categories, however.
Previous studies have shown that some undergraduate students
are able to successfully reason about natural selection using
accurate knowledge elements (key concepts) without employ-
ing any naive ideas (Nehm and Schonfeld 2008; Nehm and Ha
2011). Though prior work has not investigated non-adaptive
reasoning specifically in relation to the aforementioned expert–
novice continuum, the students from these studies would be
considered “emerging experts” rather than “experts,” because
despite their lack of naive ideas, they do not include non-
adaptive processes (e.g., genetic drift) as possible mechanisms
of evolutionary change in their explanations. Furthermore, the
participants in these studies were enrolled in introductory biol-
ogy courses for majors and, presumably, had limited exposure
to non-adaptive mechanisms of evolutionary change. Whether
these students needed more exposure to instruction about non-
adaptive reasoning before integrating it into their mental frame-
works of evolution remains to be determined. In short, this
evolutionary competency framework is used to situate stu-
dents’ evolutionary reasoning sophistication in our study.
Research Questions
In this study we ask three questions: (1) Do students use non-
adaptive factors to explain evolutionary change, and if so,
does the frequency increase with increasing evolution course-
work? (2) Is the use of non-adaptive reasoning patterns asso-
ciated with greater knowledge of natural selection, or with
fewer naive ideas? (3) What do students’ explanatory models
of evolutionary change look like when both adaptive and non-
adaptive factors are included?
Sample
We gathered data from undergraduate biology majors at a large,
public, Midwestern research university in the United States.
Fifty-five students from two groups were studied. The first
group was from early in a college biology program (second
semester introductory biology) and the second was from late in
the program (an advanced organismal biology class with a
prerequisite of an upper-division evolution class). The first
group was exposed to basic evolution content (including non-
adaptive factors such as genetic drift), and evolution was also
considered by the course instructor to be a “key theme.” For the
first group, Campbell and colleagues’ (2008) introductory text-
book, Biology, was recommended but not required reading.
Two lab exercises (out of eight) and nine lecture topics (out of
17) covered evolutionary concepts. Of the assigned readings in
the recommended book, four pages consisting of approximately
fifteen paragraphs covered genetic drift and gene flow (non-
adaptive processes) and an entire chapter and approximately 25
paragraphs covered natural selection (Campbell et al. 2008).
The second group had extensive exposure to evolution (includ-
ing selective and non-adaptive factors) in the introductory biology
course, the advanced evolution course, and in the advanced
organismal biology course. The pre-requisite evolution course
required Ridley’s (2004)Evolution textbook, and the entire course
was devoted to micro- and macroevolutionary topics. “Neutral
2 Key concepts here refer to the generally agreed upon elements that
constitute natural selection (e.g., presence and causes of variation and
differential survival and reproduction; Nehm and Schonfeld, 2010).
Naive ideas (or misconceptions; alternative conceptions) refer to ex-
planatory units that are inaccurate based upon the context in which they
are being used (Nehm et al. 2010b). For example, explaining that an
animal or plant has a need is not inaccurate per se, but explaining
evolutionary change as being caused by the animal or plant’s need is
inaccurate.
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theory and genetic drift” was the topic for one lecture (out of 18)
and therewas an associated class on “selection, variation and drift”
spread over two recitation periods (out of 16). The corresponding
assigned chapters were titled “Random events in population
genetics,” “Natural selection and random drift,” and “Adaptive
explanation” (Ridley 2004). Non-adaptive factors like genetic
drift and constraint were covered much more extensively in this
text compared to the introductory biology textbook. The ad-
vanced organismal course did not specifically cover any evolu-
tionary causal factors (e.g., selection or drift), nor did the assigned
reading from the required textbook, Mammalogy by Feldhamer
et al. (2007). This lack of specific coverage of natural selection
and genetic drift was expected, as the evolution course is a
prerequisite for the advanced organismal biology course, and
thus students are expected to have an understanding of evolu-
tionary causal factors when they begin the advanced course.
For brevity, we will refer to these two samples of partic-
ipants as “majors” and “advanced majors.” The majors
sample consisted of 28 students (43% male, 57% female)
with an average age of 20.4 years. The advanced majors
sample comprised 27 students (56% male and 44% female)
with an average age of 21.9 years. The majority of students
in both samples were White, non-Hispanic.
Methods
We used three methods to gather data on evolutionary reason-
ing patterns in the participants: (1) clinical oral interviews, (2)
the open-response ACORNS assessment (Nehm et al. 2012),
and (3) the multiple-choice CINS test (Anderson et al. 2002).
Despite displaying psychometric problems (Battisti et al.
2010; Nehm and Schonfeld 2008, 2010), the CINS is recog-
nized as an instrument capable of generating valid inferences
about general levels of students’ evolutionary knowledge.
Each item of the CINS has one correct response option for
Table 2 A theoretical framework for novice-expert evolutionary reasoning about natural selection and genetic drift
Level of
Expertise
Reasoning Model Example Reference
Expert Adaptive+Non-adaptive “Although the initial divergence of Homo from the
australopiths may have involved selection, divergence
after this time (at least in the facial characters analyzed)
could have occurred through random
processes alone.”
(Ackermann and Cheverud 2004,
p. 17951)Both natural selection and genetic
drift collectively explain patterns
of evolutionary change.
“This result suggests that both random and to a lesser
extent nonrandom processes played an important role
in the diversification of this morphologically diverse
group; it does not necessarily mean that both played
a role across all parts of the group.”
(Ackermann and Cheverud 2004,
p. 17949)
Adaptive vs. Non-adaptive “QTL data do provide information on the roles
of natural selection vs. genetic drift in phenotypic
evolution.”
(Orr 1998, p. 2102)
Either natural selection or genetic
drift leads to evolutionary change.
Emerging
Expert
Adaptive (key concepts only) “A mutation may have taken place that allowed a
locust to be immune to DDT, this trait was then
passed on. These immune locust were the only
(ones) that survived and reproduced. Over time,
the mutated trait became common of the locust
species ‘migratoria’.”
(Nehm and Ha 2011;
supplementary materials)
See also this paper.
Only natural selection explains
evolutionary change.
Novice Mixed/Synthetic (naive ideas
and key concepts)
“Due to the fact that animals continually ate the “broken
bush” species, the species developed a poison that would
fight off predators. This poison worked, and more and
more plants decided to use such a survival strategy. Only
the strong survived and reproduced, which were the plant
species containing poison.”
(Nehm and Ha 2011;
supplementary materials)
Naive ideas and natural selection
explain evolutionary change.
See also this paper.
Pure Naive (naive ideas) “Flightless bird species could have originated from
other bird species that can fly because they did not
have a specific need for flight. Since they didn’t need
and/or use their wings for flight, a selective pressure may
have worked on them to cause their wings to become
flightless.”
(Nehm and Ha 2011;
supplementary materials)Only Naive ideas explain
evolutionary change. See also this paper.
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each question; therefore, the total score of the CINS instru-
ment ranged from 0 to 20. While the original CINS paper
suggests that it is a test only of natural selection knowledge, in
fact it includes some questions about speciation, which is
widely recognized as a macroevolutionary concept (Futuyma
2009). For our sample of biology students, the reliability of
CINS scores (measured with Cronbach’s alpha) was 0.7.
The second instrument that we used was the newly devel-
oped open-response ACORNS (Assessing COntextual Rea-
soning about Natural Selection; Nehm et al. 2012). We used
four isomorphic ACORNS items, standardized by familiarity:
(1) How would biologists explain how a living mouse species
without claws evolved from an ancestral mouse species that
had claws? (2) How would biologists explain how a living lily
species without petals evolved from an ancestral lily species
that had petals? (3) Howwould biologists explain how a living
snail species with teeth evolved from an ancestral snail species
that lacked teeth? (4) How would biologists explain how a
living grape species with tendrils evolved from an ancestral
grape species that lacked tendrils?
The ACORNS is a test of both microevolutionary and
macroevolutionary knowledge because it prompts students
to explain the causes responsible for between-species (i.e.,
macroevolutionary) change from a biologist’s perspective.
To score students’ ACORNS responses, we utilized the
published rubrics of Nehm and colleagues (Nehm et al.
2010a). This scoring rubric includes seven key conceptions
and six naive ideas. This scoring rubric identifies three core
key concepts as necessary and sufficient to explain evolu-
tionary patterns using the natural selection model: (1) the
presence and causes of variation (mutation, recombination,
sex), (2) the heritability of variation, and (3) the differential
reproduction and/or survival of individuals. It also includes
four other key concepts that are widely accepted additional
elements for explaining evolutionary patterns of change by
natural selection: (4) hyper-fecundity or “overproduction”
of offspring, (5) limited resources, (6) competition, and (7) a
change in the distribution of produced phenotypic/genotypic
variation across generations. The scoring rubric also includes
naive ideas (e.g., “needs and/or goals cause evolutionary
change,” that “pressures” applied to organisms can “push”
them to change, and that the disuse of phenotypic features
proximally produces evolutionary loss). Key concept scores
for each item ranged from 0 to 7, and naive idea scores for each
item ranged from 0 to 6. The ACORNS responses were scored
to consensus by two raters: a Ph.D. student in biology educa-
tion and an evolutionary biologist. ACORNS reliabilities (mea-
sured using Cronbach’s alpha) were 0.8 for key concepts, 0.6
for naive ideas, and 0.8 for reasoning about non-adaptive
factors (for detailed scoring examples, see below).
The third approach that we used to explore students’ evo-
lutionary reasoning was clinical oral interviews. All 55 stu-
dents were recruited as volunteers by the interviewer by e-mail
as well as at the beginning and end of various class periods
and laboratory sessions, and these participants reflected the
performance distribution in the overall sample. All partici-
pants were offered USD $20 for their participation. Approx-
imately 16 hours of interviews were audio recorded and
transcribed. The majors participated in more than ten hours
of oral questioning (mean 19 minutes/student; range of 12–
34 minutes). The advanced majors participated in more than
six hours of oral questioning (mean 15 minutes/student; range
8–24 minutes).
The interview protocol was comprised of two ACORNS
items (identical to those on the written instrument) and two
novel, isomorphic items (i.e., taxa and traits of comparable
familiarity; see Nehm et al. 2012). The two novel isomor-
phic items were included in the interview to minimize a
potential testing effect (i.e., higher scores because of prior
attempts to solve the same problem). While answering,
students were prompted by the interviewer to elaborate on
what they had said or to clarify what they meant by the
words that they used. Follow-up questions included prompts
such as “Can you tell me more about X?” “Can you explain
what you mean when you use the word X?” and “Can you
tell me a little bit more about how X would happen, in
general terms?” Interviews were analyzed by two raters
and scored 0 for the absence of non-adaptive factors, key
concepts, or naive ideas, and 1 for the presence of non-
adaptive factors, key concepts, or naive ideas. Holistic com-
petency scores (−1, 0, +1) were also assigned to each stu-
dent following Nehm and Schonfeld (2008). An
evolutionary biologist and a biology education Ph.D. stu-
dent assigned all oral interviews an overall competency
score. Initial inter-rater reliabilities were 0.75 for oral inter-
view scoring, and all discrepancies were subsequently re-
solved by deliberation. Consensus scores were used in all
subsequent analyses.
We calculated descriptive statistics for the two samples
(majors and advanced majors) and compared participant
performance for all measured variables between the two
groups using t tests. This information is useful for aligning
our student sample with previously studied student samples
in evolution education that used the same instruments (e.g.,
CINS). We also calculated Pearson correlation coefficients
to examine putative interrelationships among measured var-
iables from the multiple-choice CINS test, the open-
response ACORNS test, and the clinical interviews. Varia-
bles included (1) the number of correct CINS scores, (2) the
number of written key concepts of natural selection docu-
mented in the ACORNS, (3) the number of written naive
ideas identified in the ACORNS, (4) the number of written
non-adaptive evolutionary factors in the ACORNS, (5) the
number of mentions (or “naming”) of non-adaptive evolu-
tionary factors in the clinical interviews, (6) the number of
key concepts of natural selection in the interviews, and (7)
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the naive ideas mentioned in the interviews. Pearson corre-
lation coefficients were calculated in PASW v. 18.
Finally, we used qualitative methods to examine the
structure of students’ reasoning patterns. We examined tran-
scripts of the interviews for (1) patterns of how students
incorporated non-adaptive causal factors, such as genetic
drift, into their explanations and (2) whether they conceptu-
alized non-adaptive factors to be an alternative to, or syner-
gistic with, selection. The purpose of including oral
interviews was not only to validate inferences derived from
students’ written answers, but also to create a holistic snap-
shot of students’ evolutionary reasoning patterns.
Results
Associations Among Evolutionary Reasoning Elements Pear-
son correlation analyses indicated that non-adaptive factors
scores from the interview were significantly correlated with
non-adaptive factors scores from the open-response ACORNS,
but not with any scores from the multiple-choice CINS
(Table 3). Specifically, both “mentioning” and “scientifically
explaining” non-adaptive factors scores from the interviews
displayed strong and significant associations with ACORNS
non-adaptive factors scores (r00.86, p<0.01 and r00.84,
p<0.01, respectively). Higher non-adaptive “explaining”
scores were not significantly associated with greater key con-
cept scores for the ACORNS (r00.04, n.s.) or with higher
CINS scores (r00.08, n.s.). Thus, reasoning using non-
adaptive factors appears to be a somewhat distinct reasoning
pattern from selective reasoning.
Explanatory Elements Used by Majors and Advanced
Majors We compared the types and frequencies of concep-
tual elements used in students’ explanations of evolutionary
change (Fig. 1). Though not significant, we found slight
increases in students’ accurate knowledge elements (key
concepts, CINS scores) between the samples of majors and
advanced majors using both interview data and ACORNS
data (CINS: t4701.33, p>0.05; ACORNS key concept: t530
0.63, p>0.05; Interviews key concept: t5301.31, p>0.05).
The types and frequencies of naive ideas also did not differ
appreciably between the two groups (ACORNS: t5300.88,
p>0.05; Interviews: t5300.24, p>0.05). In contrast, use of
non-adaptive factors was much more frequent with the
advanced majors, as measured by both the clinical inter-
views and the open-response ACORNS test (the CINS does
not include non-adaptive options; Fig. 1). However, use of
non-adaptive factors was only significant for those students
who “mentioned” non-adaptive factors in their interview
responses (t2802.25, p<0.05, d00.61; Cohen 1988) and
not for those whose non-adaptive factors were “scientific.”
Explanatory Elements Used in the ACORNS and Clinical
Interviews The key concepts of variability, differential surviv-
al, and limited resources were the three most frequently used
in the ACORNS responses and in the clinical interviews
(Fig. 2). However, the relative frequencies of these concepts
differed for each assessment. In the interviews, variabilitywas
the most frequent, followed by limited resources and then
differential survival. Overall, key concepts were used more
often in the interviews than in the written ACORNS instru-
ment. In the written ACORNS assessment, differential surviv-
al was used most frequently, followed by variability and then
limited resources. Relative proportions of the other four key
concepts were similar between written and oral responses, and
in order of relative frequencies were heritability, change in the
frequency of a variant in a population, competition, and
hyper-fecundity. Hyper-fecundity was the least frequently ap-
plied key concept; it was never used in the ACORNS and was
only used once in the interviews. Overall, key concepts were
greater in number in the interviews than in the ACORNS,
which is expected given the greater time allotted to oral
questioning. Students spent almost twice as much time
Table 3 Correlations among scores derived from the CINS, ACORNS, and clinical interviews
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) CINS 1.000
(2) ACORNS KC 0.426** 1.000
(3) Interview KC 0.401** 0.566** 1.000
(4) ACORNS MIS −0.355** −0.377** −0.521** 1.000
(5) Interview MIS −0.158 −0.213 −0.354** 0.550** 1.000
(6) ACORNS NAF 0.017 −0.038 0.046 −0.169 −0.043 1.000
(7) Mentioning NAF 0.002 −0.089 0.046 −0.158 −0.121 0.861** 1.000
(8) Scientific NAF 0.079 0.039 0.060 −0.157 −0.068 0.835** 0.851** 1.000
N055
NAF non-adaptive factors, KC key concepts, MIS naive Ideas
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
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answering interview questions as they did answering
ACORNS items (ACORNS: M010.9, SD07.2 minutes; In-
terview:M021.9, SD07.7 minutes (Fig. 2). Overall, however,
there was good correspondence between measures derived
from the two methods.
Similar to the key concept patterns that we documented,
naive ideas were more abundant in interview responses than
in the ACORNS responses (Fig. 2). In both oral interviews
and in written responses, however, naive ideas were much
more variable across items than key concepts. The most
frequent naive idea used in both the interviews and in the
ACORNS was needs/goals. The naive ideas use/disuse,
energy, and pressure were about equally common in
ACORNS responses. Adapt was the least common naive
idea found in the ACORNS responses. In the interviews,
the second most common naive idea was pressure, while
adapt and energy were equally the next most frequent. Use/
disuse was the least common naive idea used during inter-
views. Two notable patterns were noted relating to non-
adaptive factors in both the ACORNS and in the interviews.
First, non-adaptive factors were used in the first item more
often than in the other items, and second, they were applied
inconsistently across items (Fig. 2, top row). In short, the
interviews tended to elicit greater frequencies of ideas, but
not different ideas, than those revealed in the ACORNS.
Non-adaptive factors were rarely used regardless of the
method of detection used, and naive ideas were less com-
mon than key concepts.
Holistic Reasoning Patterns Interview data revealed that all
of the students who incorporated non-adaptive factors into
their explanations of evolutionary change (eight out of 55)
presented non-adaptive factors in the form of “genetic drift,”
“bottleneck,” or “founder’s effect” (See Table 4). Moreover,
in all cases students represented a non-adaptive factor as an
alternative to natural selection. This finding is in line with
how many evolutionary biologists conceptualize the two
Fig. 1 A ACORNS and I interview. a Average scores of both majors
and advanced majors for the CINS, b key concepts in the written
ACORNS assessment and interviews c naive ideas used in the
ACORNS and interviews, and d Non-adaptive ideas used in the
ACORNS and interviews. Though advanced majors show a slight
increase in key concepts used and a slight decrease in naive ideas used,
this trend is non-significant. However, advanced majors do use signif-
icantly more non-adaptive ideas in their evolutionary explanations
compared to majors
Fig. 2 Diversity and
abundance of explanatory
elements used in the ACORNS
and the clinical interviews.
Both key concepts and naive
ideas were more abundant in
interviews than in the
ACORNS. Non-adaptive fac-
tors were used more often in the
first item than subsequent items
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concepts, where evolutionary change is attributed to either
natural selection or genetic drift (e.g., Orr 1998).
While at first glance the observation that students dis-
cussed genetic drift as an alternative to natural selection was
indicative of expert-like thinking (see the “Introduction”
section), follow-up questions during the interviews often
revealed that many students poorly understood the concepts
of genetic drift and/or natural selection. Indeed, only one
student (Participant G from the advanced majors sample)
accurately and consistently used both genetic drift and nat-
ural selection as possible mechanisms for evolutionary
change across the four interview items (see below).
Participant G: Another way would be more like
genetic drift oriented, where, the presence or absence
of a tail doesn’t matter very much. So, maybe it has no
fitness ramifications in survivability and it just kinda
[sic] fluctuates based on just randomness, you know,
statistics, until eventually you’ve got all the opossums
don’t have tails. That sort of random stuff does happen,
sometimes, and it brings genes towards fixture that way.
But, I would say, cause it, I would say most biologists
would go with either natural selection or gene drift to
explain the loss of tail over time in opossums.
A second student from the advanced majors presented
“genetic drift” as one possible solution for the fourth inter-
view item about cactus spines (see the “Methods” section).
Participant E: I guess that could be similar with either,
like a genetic mutation or maybe a genetic drift and,
uh, just, could also have to do with, uh, like being an
Table 4 Selected excerpts from students who used non-adaptive factors in clinical oral interviews
Participant Non-adaptive
terms used





(−1, 0 or +1)
A Bottleneck,
founder’s effect
“It could be the bottleneck effect or the founder’s effect, like the
ancestor species could have had like a nat-, disaster, like a,
calamity, so only a few of the, uh, individuals survived and those
individuals like maybe had like a dwarf gene, or like a, like a gimp
tail I guess. And then eventually it started being more prevalent in
the, in the new species that started from there.”
0.5 0
B Bottleneck “Or, um, if there were opossums with shorter tails and something
happened to like bottleneck them or something, and it didn’t have,
uh, an advantage or disadvantage they could just go away
randomly.”
0.5 1
C Founder’s effect (defining the word) “Um, it’s like when, uh, part of the population





“Um, I guess that would be a founder effect I think, or a
bottleneck. Um, so the species without petals not necessarily that
it was favored but because it was in greater variety or greater, uh,
it was in greater number than the ones without, that had the larger
petals, it eventually, uh, I guess it was eventually derived to a
species without petals, in the living species today.”
0 1
E Genetic drift “I always forget the definition of genetic drift. Um, it’s kinda just
like, uh, a swing towards one extreme instead of where it was
before, but I guess, so I guess that kind of takes away from what I





“I guess with genetic drift what would happen is, um, like a random
grouping of like, let’s say out of a hundred only four of these just
happen to have, like, this mutation…so over time, like, their genes
were the ones that were being passed down randomly, um, into the
population, and it just happened to be that as time went on, it was
their genes that caused the population, like, not really caused the
population but, um, is what the population formed into.”
0 1
G Gene drift, genetic
drift
“you’ve got your random genetic drift option where there was
variation in the presence or absence of teeth in the first species,
and then randomly, you know, maybe due to natural disasters, or
just certain members got lucky in breeding, you’d have the fixture
of the lack, or the presence of teeth.”
1 1
H Genetic drift “I think the way genetic drift influence it, is that through time and
passing on of traits and genes, that it was affected, oh gosh, I feel
like I’m rambling and I’m not really saying anything. (long pause)
I can’t really think of what I want to say with genetic drift.”
−1 0
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anti-predatory defense to, uh, protect it since it’s in a
harsh environment already, they kinda [sic] have to
guard themselves from anything that’s going to get
water out of them.
Interviewer: You said that it could be a genetic mutation
or genetic drift, can you explain what you mean by
genetic drift?
Participant E: I always forget the definition of genetic
drift. Um, it’s kinda [sic] just like, uh, a swing towards
one extreme instead of where it was before, but I guess,
so I guess that kind of takes away fromwhat I was going
towards, I guess, kinda [sic] contradicted myself.
Interviewer: What’s swinging? What is it that is
swinging towards one extreme?
Participant E: Uh, just kinda [sic] like, the genetic
makeup or the, uh, actual structures that are present
are kinda [sic] more of a shift from one to another
based on the pressures that they’re getting from the
environment or from, from other species around them.
Interviewer: When you say structures, do you mean,
um, what do you mean by that?
Participant E: Um, sorta [sic] like the actual spines, in
this case, or uh, the the [sic] cells within, that are used
to maintain the water and the moisture and hold it.
Interviewer: And how, how does that process of
swinging towards one of the extremes or another come
about?
Participant E: Um, I guess that would be more, type of
a, kind of, more of natural selection, where they’re,
where if they don’t change then they’re just going to
die out, so without, if the, if they didn’t develop the
spines, there’d be no way for them to completely
protect themselves, they would, without spines they’d
probably evolved in another way and came up with
some sort of poison or something else that would have
deterred predators and stuff from eating them.
While participant E mentions the term “genetic drift,” his
explanation for this term was scientifically inaccurate (he
confuses genetic drift with directional selection, and he was
therefore given a scientific non-adaptive factors score of
“0”). His answer demonstrates that a student’s use of a
scientific term is not always indicative of scientific under-
standing of a concept (cf. Rector et al. 2012). This situation
also occurred with students’ use of the terms “bottleneck”
and “founder effect.”
Overall, clinical interviews corroborated our statistical
findings that knowledge of non-adaptive factors is not asso-
ciated with greater understanding of natural selection, or
with fewer naive evolutionary ideas. Similarly, in clinical
interviews and in ACORNS responses, most students incon-
sistently applied non-adaptive factors, or lacked what has
been termed “knowledge coherence” (Kampourakis and
Zogza 2009).
Evolutionary Reasoning Competencies in the Two Groups We
found that on the spectrum of novice to expert reasoning
about evolutionary change, the majority of our students
(both majors and advanced majors) fell into the novice
category (Table 2, Fig. 3). Recall that the novice category
was characterized by naive or naive+scientific reasoning.
Based upon the written explanations, only one student from
the majors held a purely naive model, while no students
from the advanced majors group held such models. In the
interviews, none of the students from either group were
found to exhibit purely naive models. Most students
exhibited mixed models comprised of both naive ideas and
key concepts (Fig. 3). Written responses indicated that 16
majors and 14 advanced majors held mixed models, where-
as interview responses indicated that both groups had 19
students exhibiting mixed models. Interestingly, a small
number of students from each group displayed mixed mod-
els while also incorporating non-adaptive reasoning into
their explanations (ACORNS: two from the majors, two
from the advanced majors; Interviews: one from the majors,
four from the advanced majors) (Fig. 3). There were a
Fig. 3 Percentage of students who fall into each category of expertise.
The majority of students used mixed models, though a small portion of
these also included non-adaptive factors into their explanations (shaded
gray). A large portion of students also held pure adaptive models and
would therefore be considered emerging experts. Only advanced majors
reached expert-like levels of reasoning and these students used adaptive
vs. non-adaptive models. No students held adaptive+non-adaptive mod-
els of evolutionary reasoning
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number of students categorized as emerging experts based
on their written explanations using purely adaptive models
(eight majors, ten advanced majors). During the interviews,
in contrast, seven majors exhibited purely adaptive models,
although only two advanced majors used key concepts
exclusively (Fig. 3). Nevertheless, a small number of ad-
vanced majors fell into the expert category (that is, students
explaining evolutionary change using both adaptive and
non-adaptive conceptual models; ACORNS: two students;
Interviews: three students). No students from the majors
reached the expert level.
It was challenging to unambiguously situate a few students
along our novice–expert continuum. For instance, one student
from the advanced majors displayed a complex mixed model
(naive ideas+key concept+non-adaptive factors) in the inter-
view (See Supplementary Materials, Participant F), but not in
the written assessment. Based on her ACORNS responses, we
placed Participant F in the adaptive vs. non-adaptive model of
reasoning even though she had provided explanations using
non-adaptive factors exclusively. She was placed in this cat-
egory because she had used key concepts (variability and
change of population) in her explanations of genetic drift.
Her response demonstrated that some key concepts were not
specific to natural selection; in fact, key concepts such as
variability and change of population are necessary for
explaining evolutionary change by stochastic processes
(e.g., genetic drift) as well as deterministic processes (e.g.,
natural selection). Accordingly, this student was labeled as
having an expert-like model of evolutionary reasoning. How-
ever, placing students along a continuum of evolutionary
reasoning competency was straightforward in most cases.
Classifying our two student samples revealed that, regardless
of the assessment method or amount of biology coursework
completed, and despite direct instruction of genetic drift, most
students failed to reach expert-like levels of reasoning about
evolutionary change.
Discussion
While science education research has produced a large body
of work investigating the learning, teaching and assessment
of natural selection (e.g., Bishop and Anderson 1990;
Demastes et al. 1995; Settlage 1994; Nehm and Schonfeld
2008; Nehm and Ha 2011), strikingly few studies have
focused on students’ thinking about non-adaptive evolution-
ary factors such as genetic drift, despite its important role in
experts’ empirical tests and theoretical models of evolution-
ary change (e.g., Ackermann and Cheverud 2004; Lande
1976; Orr 1998; Parker and Maynard Smith 1990). This gap
in the literature motivated our exploration of evolutionary
reasoning using non-adaptive factors in undergraduate stu-
dents, and whether such patterns differed between groups of
introductory and advanced biology students exposed to
varying degrees of non-adaptive content. We used three
different methodologies to explore students’ evolutionary
reasoning: the multiple-choice CINS, which ignores non-
adaptive factors but measures understanding of natural
selection and speciation; the ACORNS, a constructed-
response format test that captures students’ evolutionary
explanations across contextual features; and extended clin-
ical oral interviews. We used these three different methods
to rigorously and holistically determine how, and to what
degree, students used stochastic and non-deterministic fac-
tors to explain evolutionary change, and how their explan-
atory models were constructed.
Students’ Use of Non-adaptive Factors Given Gould and
Lewontin’s (1979) widely cited criticisms about biologists’
over-reliance on exclusively adaptive factors to explain evo-
lutionary change, and contemporary biologists’ use of hypoth-
esis tests that explore the relative contributions of non-
adaptive mechanisms such as genetic drift in evolutionary
change, the goal for biology students should be to understand
and apply the mechanisms that the field of evolutionary biol-
ogy currently uses to account for organismal diversity through
time and space (Gould 2002). In short, students’ competency
in evolutionary reasoning should be measured by their ability
to consider both drift and selection as possible causal mecha-
nisms in their explanations for trait change. What our study
reveals is that the vast majority of our participants have not
reached this competency benchmark.
Student use of non-adaptive factors in their reasoning is not
associated with greater knowledge of natural selection or with
fewer naive ideas about evolution.Most students in the majors
and advanced major samples used mixed models of evolu-
tionary reasoning, suggesting that despite increased instruc-
tion in evolution, most students failed to progress in their
understanding of evolutionary change. Instead, their
responses imply that they added new concepts (e.g., genetic
drift or differential survival) into their existing naive explan-
atory frameworks. Regardless of the amount of biology cour-
sework that students completed, they expressed both key
concepts and naive ideas at comparatively the same frequency
when cued to reason about evolutionary change (Fig. 3).
Nevertheless, advanced majors’ relatively greater use of
non-adaptive factors suggests that increased exposure to in-
struction about non-adaptive processes, such as genetic drift,
is in fact associated with increases in students’ use of non-
adaptive factors in their evolutionary explanations, (albeit not
at desired magnitudes; see Fig. 1).
The Structure of Students’ Explanatory Models of Evolu-
tionary Change When students did use non-adaptive factors
in their explanatory models of evolution, they either used
them within a mixed model of reasoning, or they used them
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as competing mechanisms of evolutionary change (i.e., in an
expert-like model of adaptive vs. non-adaptive reasoning;
Fig. 3). Additionally, most students did not consistently apply
non-adaptive factors across items (Fig. 2). It could be that the
association of this concept within students’ evolutionary rea-
soning framework is not theory-like (Vosniadou et al. 2008),
that it was selectively cued across items differing in surface
features (Nehm et al. 2012; Nehm and Ha 2011) or that
students simply prefer one scientific model over another
(Bachelard 1968; Duit 2003). Indeed, only two of the three
students from the advanced majors group who did use non-
adaptive factors did so consistently and expressed an adaptive
vs. non-adaptive model of reasoning about evolutionary
change. This corroborates previous work suggesting that
expert-like evolutionary reasoningmodels includemore stable
associations of concepts within conceptual reasoning frame-
works (Nehm and Ha 2011; Nehm and Ridgway 2011).
Those students who reached an expert-like model of evo-
lutionary causation adopted models of adaptive vs. non-
adaptive change, but none of them expressed integrative caus-
al models (i.e., the top level of Table 2). For example, Partic-
ipant G (see excerpt above) was a student from the advanced
majors group who included both natural selection and non-
adaptive factors across all four items in both the ACORNS
written assessment and in the interview. Participant G
employed what we term an expert-like model of reasoning,
although one that frames adaptive causation as competing
with stochastic causation of evolutionary change. Another
student, Participant F, provided only non-adaptive factors in
the ACORNS explanations, yet also discussed non-adaptive
factors and selection as possible alternative causal mecha-
nisms of evolutionary change in the interviews. It is interest-
ing that the written format of the ACORNS elicited non-
adaptive factors only, while the interviews elicited both pos-
sible mechanisms. However, this seems to be an anomaly and
not significant enough to warrant any adjustments to our
framework of novice–expert reasoning about evolutionary
change (Fig. 2). Regardless of assessment format, this student
reached expert levels of reasoning.
Implications for Teaching and Learning Our study demon-
strates that current approaches to teaching genetic drift and
other non-deterministic processes may not be effective at
helping the majority of students build expert-like models of
evolutionary causation. Students’ models of evolutionary
change in our sample were overwhelmingly composed of a
combination of naive ideas and key concepts of natural selec-
tion (Fig. 2). Not only is this the case for majors in introduc-
tory courses; it is also true of advanced majors who have
successfully completed an entire course in evolutionary biol-
ogy. Exposure to genetic drift does not appear to be sufficient
for inducing students to accommodate non-adaptive factors
into their mental models of evolutionary change and build
expert-like explanatory models (i.e., Table 2, top row). This
finding suggests that teachers shouldmove beyond definitions
or simulations of genetic drift (e.g., Staub 2002) and illustrate
to students how genetic drift is conceptually structured within
models of evolutionary causation. Teachers could present
cases of how evolutionary biologists currently use both genet-
ic drift and natural selection to test alternative hypotheses and
build explanatory models of evolutionary change. Such exam-
ples may facilitate more advanced perspectives on non-
adaptive and adaptive causal factors in evolutionary biology
(e.g., Orr 1998; Ackermann and Cheverud 2004).
Our findings also suggest that evolutionary reasoning us-
ing non-adaptive factors and scientifically accurate selective
reasoning are distinct. This raises the question of whether the
lack of an association among non-adaptive factors, key con-
cepts, and naive ideas is a product of the way these evolution-
ary concepts are taught, or if it is an intrinsic way of thinking
about evolution. For instance, perhaps students fail to use
non-adaptive factors in their evolutionary explanations be-
cause they view the lack of emphasis on drift in the classroom
as indicative of its relatively low level of importance in
evolutionary change. On the other hand, students may fail to
use non-adaptive factors in their evolutionary explanations
because the concept is more difficult to accommodate into
existing cognitive frameworks compared to selective reason-
ing concepts. Regardless, based on students’ response pat-
terns, it appears that they have not sufficiently accommodated
non-adaptive factors into their evolutionary reasoning frame-
works, even after advanced instruction in evolution. Rather,
interviews and open-response assessments clearly indicate
that most students at introductory and advanced levels of
instruction assimilate non-adaptive concepts with key con-
cepts and naive ideas of selective reasoning into unstable (i.e.,
non-coherent), naive models of evolutionary causation (cf.
Kampourakis and Zogza 2009; Nehm and Ha 2011). It is
important to note, however, that student response patterns
may not always mirror cognitive processes, and our interpre-
tations are constrained by the methods we used to uncover
student thinking and the sample that we studied.
The finding that no students used adaptive+non-adaptive
causation models in their explanations of evolutionary change
raises the question of whether this, too, is a product of teach-
ing experiences or a default approach to thinking about evo-
lution. Non-adaptive factors such as genetic drift often receive
minor instructional focus and are presented as an alternative
model to natural selection (e.g., Linhart 1997). It is possible
that standard approaches prevent students from conceptualiz-
ing cases in which stochastic processes work in tandem with
selective processes to generate patterns of genotypic and
phenotypic change. Such integrated causal models (adaptive
+non-adaptive) are perhaps more complex, and thereby may
be beyond the grasp of students still struggling to restructure
common naive ideas. Indeed, it may require more
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comprehensive evolution instruction using extensive theoret-
ical and experimental examples. However, it is important to
note that some evolution experts continue to use an adaptive
vs. non-adaptive model of evolutionary change in their re-
search programs (e.g., Orr 1998), and so it is possible that an
adaptive+non-adaptive model is simply a less common, al-
ternative framework for experts within evolutionary biology.
Further work is needed to explore this issue.
Overall, our study highlights the fact that non-adaptive
factors receive very little attention in the science education
or evolution education literature. Future research exploring
novice and expert understanding and application of non-
adaptive factors would help to reveal what a more expert-
like model of evolutionary reasoning would look like and
could inform the design of evolution learning progressions
(cf. Catley et al. 2005).
Implications for Assessment Assessments are central to help-
ing teachers foster meaningful science learning (NRC 2001b).
However, it is imperative that those assessments meet quality
control criteria established by the educational measurement
community (AERA et al. 1999). Measurement instruments,
among other things, must comprehensively assess all facets of
a well-defined construct (Neumann et al. 2011). In the domain
of evolutionary biology, natural selection and genetic drift are
the two most important causal factors that biologists use to
explain evolutionary change (Orr 1998). Thus, to measure
evolutionary thinking, instruments must provide the opportu-
nity for students to explain change using natural selection,
genetic drift, or combinations of drift+selection. Currently,
there are no such instruments.
One important consideration for helping teachers to under-
stand students’ thinking about evolution is to employ instru-
ments that are capable of capturing progress in students’
conceptual growth. As we argue, measuring progress in evo-
lutionary reasoning requires the consideration of both non-
adaptive and adaptive factors in evolutionary causation, in
addition to common naive ideas about evolutionary change
(Table 2). Many widely used instruments, nevertheless, ignore
the possibility that non-adaptive factors (such as genetic drift)
could contribute to patterns of evolutionary change that the
instrument scenarios present (e.g., Bird beak evolution in
Anderson et al.’s CINS instrument). Thus, teachers across
the educational hierarchy must develop and deploy instru-
ments that include the measurement of reasoning using non-
adaptive factors in formative and summative assessments of
evolutionary thinking.
Multiple-choice assessments are often a popular choice
among instructors considering the time and expertise needed
to develop and grade open-ended items. However, multiple-
choice items rarely provide mixed model options (that is, not
just right or wrong options), despite the fact that such reason-
ing models may be very common in samples (as we found in
our study; Nehm 2011). If we want our assessments to fulfill
their purposes, we must consider the large proportion of
students who have mixed models for explaining evolutionary
change and revise our multiple choice assessments to reflect
this well established finding. No multiple-choice evolution
instruments to our knowledge allow for the measurement of
mixed models.
Study Limitations and Implications for Future Work on
Evolutionary Reasoning Using Non-adaptive Factors Alth-
ough we were able to describe how students reason about
evolutionary change and their use of non-adaptive factors,
we were not able to determine why students did not incor-
porate non-adaptive factors into their models of evolution-
ary causation. Because all students in our sample were
assigned readings that covered genetic drift, and had the
opportunity to listen to lectures that included the topic of
genetic drift, the lack of non-adaptive factors in students’
explanations could be due to poor teaching of the topic.
Additionally, it is unclear whether teachers incorporated
developmental constraints, or other lesser-known non-
adaptive factors (see Gould 2002), into their teaching in all
the biology classes or if it was only found in the evolution
course. It is possible that other student groups exposed to
instruction on drift in a more integrated and sophisticated
manner would show different patterns than those observed
with our sample. Thus, our findings may not generalize to
other student samples. Future studies should explore the
relationship between instruction and evolutionary reasoning
using non-adaptive factors. Such a focus would help deter-
mine whether specifically addressing non-adaptive factors
(beyond genetic drift) through instruction or teaching non-
adaptive factors in different ways, influences students’ use
of non-adaptive factors in their evolutionary explanations.
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